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ABSTRACT
With the major currencies continuously moving (if notfloating
freely) against each other, a country that does not choose to float
must decide what to peg to. If it pegs to the SDR it floatsagainst
all currencies. Thus in the system begun in theearly 1970s the very
concept of a fixed exchange rate is unclear. In this situationmany
countries have chosen to peg their currencies to a basket,or a weight-
ed average of other currencies.
The analysis of this paper is focused on fluctuations in realex-
change rates. We first show that pegging to acurrency basket is the
same as holding constant a real effective exchange rate that usesa
specific set of weights depending on a chosen policy target. We also
show the weights that correspond to particulartargets for stabilization
policy.
Next we discuss several problems involved in choosing andcomputing
optimal weights or the equivalent real effective rate. It is shown that
the index formula itself aggregates countries that are ina currency
area, so that monetary authorities should use weights based on trade
with countries rather than on currency denomination of trade.
Finally, we report on an initial empirical investigation of pegging
practices in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. These are all countries that
have moved to basket pegs, with geographically diversified trade. We
present initial estimates of the implicit weights in their baskets, and
find that all three countries experienced real appreciation relativeto
the basket during the l970s.
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Currency Baskets and Real EffectiveExchange Rates
1. Introduction and Sunry.
With the major currencies continuously moving(if not floating freely)
against each other, a country thatdoes not choose to float must decide
what to peg to. If it pegs its currency to oneof the major currencies,
It floats against the others. If it pegsto the SDR it floats against
all currencies. Thus in the system begunin the early 1970s the very
concept of a fixed exchange rateis unclear.
In this situation many countries havechosen to peg their currencies
to a basket, or a weighted averageof other currencies. This trend was
noted by Arthur Lewis in his Per Jacobssenlecture at the IMP:
"It is now the conventional wisdom that thecurrencies of
the developed countries should float,but the currencies of
the less—developed (LDC5) should not;that is to say that
each LDC should choose a more developed country(MDC) as a
partner ——orthe SDR ——andtie itself in a fixed
relationship.t' (Lewis, 1977, p. 33).
Since the SDR weights are not particularlyrelevant for any single
country,many countriescompose their ownbasket.
Generalized floating (or dirty floating) raises problems of
measurement. What is meant by "the" exchangerate in a floating,
multiple—CurrencY world? The answerthat has appeared in the literature
is an "effective" exchange rate,which is generally 50e.rade—veighted
index of changes in the home currency priceof various foreign currencies.2.
The IMFnowpublishes data on effective exchangerates. These are based
on the IMP's multiple exchangerate model (MERN), described by Artus and
Rhomberg (1973). It will be shown inthis paper that this is only one
of a possible number of definitions for anIteffectiveti exchange rate that
depends on the implicit choice of a targetfor exchange rate policy.
In an earlier paper (Branson—Katseli (B—K)(1981)] presented at a
conference in Stockholm in 1978, we derivedweights for currency baskets
that would eliminate the effects of othercountries' nominal exchange
rate fluctuations on various home—country policytargets. There we
considered the problem of choosing a currencybasket in the presenèe of
third—country exchange—late fluctuations,
holding prices constant. In this
paper we extend thatdiscussion in several ways.
First, in section 2, e focus ouranalysis on fluctuations In real
exchange rates and show that pegging to a currencybasket is the same
as holding constant a real effectiveexchange rate that uses a specific
set of weights depending on the chosen policytarget. We also show that
the optimal weights of the earlier paper canbe used for currency baskets
defined across real exchange rate fluctuations..The underlying model of
trade prices and quantities is similar tothe one in B—K (1981) and is
summarized in Appendix 1.
The model of section 2 differs from othersin the recent literature
in two respects. First, a partial equilibriumapproach is adopted as
opposed to the general equilibriummodel of Flanders and llelpman (1979).
This affects the exact composition, but notthe general form of the weights.3.
Second, we derive weights that insulate policy targets from third—country
realexchange—rate fluctuations. The alternative in the literature is to
adopt a variance—minimiziçig approach for a portfolio or a vector of targets.
Examplesare Flanders and Helpman (1979), de Macedo(1979), and Lipschitz
andSundararajan(1980). They derive weights which differ from ours in
form, being functions of the variance—covariance structure of movements
inreal exchange rates.
Insections 3 and 4 we discuss several problems involved in choosing
and computing optimal weights or the equivalent real effective rate.
In section 3 it is shown that the index formula itself aggregates countries
that are in a currency area, so that monetary authorities should use weights
based on trade with countries rather than on currency denomination of trade.
In section 4 optimal weights are combined with a crawling peg against the
basket.
Finally,in section 5 we report on an initial empirical investiga-
tion of pegging practices in Greece, Portuga1, and Spain. These are all
countries that have moved to basket pegs, with geographically diversified
trade. We present initial estimates of the implicit weights in their baskets,
and find that all three countries experienced real appreciation relative to
the basket during the 1970s..4.
2. RealEffectiveExchange Rates and OptimumWeight.flgSchemes
The objective of this sectionis to extend our previous work
(Branson—KatSeli (1981)1 on thechoice of weights for currencybaskets
and to develop further the
theoretical framework for analyzingthe cons-
truction of and role of realeffective exchange rates in theexercise of
exchange—rate policy.
It is easiest to begin with a
definition of 'a real effective
exchange rate, and then go on toshow how different currencybasket weights
define alternative real effectiverates. Table 1 gives a comp1etelisting
of the symbols that will be usedthroughout the paper.5.
Table 1:Symbols and Definitions
I —realeffective exchange rate index of the home country.
Iindex over N countries, i =1,..N.We study the 0th
country. The Nth country is the numeraire.
weights for 0's basket peg.
units of 0 currency per unit of I currency.
units of numeraire ()perunit of I currency.
runits of 0 currency per unit of numeraire ($); T1 =. r.
q1 =foreigncountry's cost index and foreign exchange ($)prices
of goods competing with 0th country exports and imports; for
simplicity it is assumed that = = q1.
p0home country cost index and price of non—traded goods.
ZdZ/Z, for any variable Z.
eexchange rate of 0 in the aggregate model of Appendix 1:
units of 0 currency per unit of foreign exchange; peq.
home (0th) country prices of exports and imports.
X,M =exportand import quantities of country zero.
0's export and importsharesfrom/to country I.
d,s= price—elasticities of export demand and supply in 0.
k =d/(d
—x'aninverse index of export market power
of country 0.
dmS= price—elasticities of import demand and supply of country 0.
—d),an inverse index of import marketpowerof
country 0.6.
Movements in a real effective rate index for the home country
(country zero) are given by
N A
(1) E w (T + q —p0);Ew =1
where the weights Wj remain to be chosen. NotIng that the bilateral
exchange rate of the home country 0 against country I (Ti) canbe decomposed
into the home country price of an arbitrarily chosen numeraire, r, and the
numeraire price of the currency i, J, the numeraire can be factored out
of the Index in (1) as follows. Substitute Jr for and add and
subtract to obtain
—
Sincethe weights sumtounity, the real exchange rate vis—a—vis the
numeraire can be factored out to give
(2) I (r + —p)
+ + q1
Inequation (2) the first term represents the home—country real exchange
rate against the numeraire, and the second term is the weighted sum of the
numeraire's real rate against all other countries.
Nov consider a policy rule that moves the nominal exchange rate
against the numeraire r to hold I constant:
(3) r+qP0 Ew1(J1+q1_q) ,orIO7.
Thi8 policy rule both stabilizes the effective real exchange rate I
definedby w1 and pegs the real rate in terms of the numeraire to the
currencybasket across all N currencies (including the numeraire) defined
by the same weights w1 .Thusif the home—country real exchange rate
vis—a—visthe numeraire is held equal to the basket real exchange rate
defined by a given set of weightsw1, thereal effective exchange rate
defined by those weights is held constant.
The weights w1 in equation (3) can be chosen to insulate one of a
number of targets from movements in third—countryexchange rates vis—a—vis
the numeraire.Examples of such targets from B—K (1981) are (a) the
terms of trade X'm, (b)thebalance of payments —
PM,and(c)
the price ratio of traded and non—traded goods. In principle, these optimal
basket weights may be calculated for a variety of policy targets. Flanders
and Helpman (1979) and Lipschitz and Sundararajan (1980), for example, derive
optimal basket weights for some of these as well as other policy targets.
The policy targets can, in turn, be expressed as combinations of
trade prices and quantities as shown In B—K (1981). In Appendix 1 changes
in trade prices and quantities are expressed as functions of movements in
(a) the home country's real exchange rate against the numeraire, r+
and(b) the numeraire's real exchange rate against third countries,
++ •Thesecan be combined to give an expression for movements
in the chosen target variable which can in turn be set equal to zero to
solve for the weighting scheme wthatinsulates that particular combination
a8.
of trade prices and quantities from movements in third—country real
exchange rates.
Balance of Trade Weights.




and to unity initially, so m =1,differentiation of this expression
for the trade balance yields
(4) dBT =(p÷X)X —(÷M)M
Here X and M are the initial levels of trade. SubstItution from equations
A.lO —A.13from Append'x (1) for p, p, X, and H gives us the following
expression for the change in the trade balance, in home currency terms:
(5) dBT =(X—H);




Thefirst term is the effect of home price changes with a given initial
balance; the second term gives the effect of changes in the real exchange
rate against the numeraire; the term in brackets is the Marshall—Lerner
condition. The last two terms give the effects of changes in third—country
real exchange rates on export and import values, respectively.9.
To obtain the weights for the currency basket that would stabilize
the trade balance, we set dBT =0in (5), and solve for the real effective
exchange rate index:
* A A X—M
A A A





withweights w given by
Xk(l+5)a
—Mk'(l+d)81 (7) Xk(l+s) —!1k'(1+d)
These are the same as the balance—of—trade weights (37) in B—K (1981),
andare essentially the same as the IMF'seffective MERNweights.If
initiallyX =N,the result of (6) for the real exchange rate against
thenumera ire N is given by
r+qP0_Ew(J+q_q)
Thenominal rate should be moved to make movemen in the real rate equal
to movement in the weighted average of third—country real rates, with
weights given by (7). These define a currency basket stabilizing the
balance of trade; they also define. an effective rate I with reference
-tostabilizing the trade balance.10.
Terms—of—trade weights.
We could derive weights insulating the terms of trade
from third—country real exchange rates from equations (A.lO) and (A.12)
in Appendix 1. However, given the balance—of trade weights in (7),
we can proceed more directly. Assume X =Ninitially, and eliminate
quantity effects from the balance—of—trade weights by assuming
s =d 0 .Thenthose weights become the terms—of—trade weights
x m
(8) W1=k-k
These are the same as (28) in B—K (1981), and they define a currency bas-
ket or effective rate that would stabilize the terms of trade. As noted
inB—K (1981),in the small—country case where k =k=1,exchange—rate
policy cannot influence the terms of trade; weights (18) are relevant
only when k k.
Weights stabilizing the relative price of traded goods.
Equation (7) gives weights for a currency basket aimed at stabi—
lizing the trade balance. These are essentially defined as weightsfor
"the" effective exchange rate in the IMPliterature.See, for example,
Artus—Bhomberg (1973). On the other hand, as early as 1976, Stanley Black
derived weights aimed at stabilizing the relative price of traded vs non—
traded goods. These define an alternative effective exchange rate
oriented toward relative prices.11.
In B—K (1981), the Black weights were showntobe the small—country
case of a more general scheme, as we now see.
Movements in the price of traded goods can be written as
p =zp +zp Txxmm,
where and are weights of exports and imports in total trade in
value terms, and z += 1.Substitutionfrom equatior (A.l0) and
(A.12) in Appendix 1 for p and p yields
(10) T =p0+ (zk + zmk)(r + q —p0)
+zkZcj(Ji + q1 —
+z k E81(J1 -
Movementsin the price of non—traded goods are given b domestic cost cQn—





withthe weihts w1 given by
zkctzk8 xi+m i (12' v =Izk+zk'
x m
Theseare the same as B—K (1981), equation (32), and they provide an
effective exchange rate or currency basket stabilizing the relative price12
of traded vs non—traded goods as third—country real exchange rates
fluctuate. In the small—country case, these simplify to total
trade weights:
w —za + z L3.
Ixi mi
These are Black's (1976) preferred weights.
The weighting expressions in equations (7), (8), and (12) give
alternative weights for currency baskets, or definitions of real effective
exchange rates, for alternative targets of exchange—rate policy. The
Important points here are that, (a) as in our earlier work [B—K (1980,1981)],
each weighting system defines an effective exhcnage :ate that corresponds
to a chosen target, but (b) the weights here,as opposed to the model in
B—K (1980, 1980),are used to define an index across real exchange rates.
Even though the analysis is a straightforward extension of the earlier model
• it is an important extension in that it permits us to consider the cases of
PPP and of independent variations in prices and exchange rates as extreme
cases of one general framework. Next we turn to some comments on the
application of weighting schemes in the exercise of exchange—rate policy.
r13.
3.Issues in calculating optimal weights.
The weighting schemes of section 2 use trade weights ct and
and they are aggregated to the point where each country has a single
import—competing price disturbance q1 and all countries have the same
elasticity of demand d for one export good. Two kinds of questions
have been raised in considering how to apply any of these schemes.
One is whether trade weights or currency weights are appropriate. The
second is how to disaggregate, in general across commodities. Two ex-
amples of the disaggregation question are whether to use trade or current
account weights, and how to adjust for the commodity composition of ex-
ports across, e.g., agriculture, mining, manufacturing. In thissection
we will consider these two kinds of questions in turt..
Trade shares vs currency shares.
Up to this point, we have noted the small—country special case in
passing. But we have left for separate discussion a problem that general—
ly appears as one of two seemingly different questions. These are as
follows: (1) How should trade weights be modified if trade is denominated
in a world currency? For example, Zambia's copper exports are stated in
sterling as determined on the London metal exchange. (2) Should we not
use shares of currency denomInation in the and B weights, rather than
direction of trade? The first question was first raised at a seminar at
Columbia University, April 19, 1978. The second was raised in Lipschitz (1979)
and again in discussions at the Finance Ministry in New Delhi, and the Monetary
Authority of Singapore, January 9 and 28, 1980. Here we show that these questions
are essentially the same, that they are really the question of thesmallness of thu14.
countries, and that they are already answered in the formulation of the
real exchange rate in the weighting schemes of section 2.
Consider first the question of using currency area weights in-
stead of trade weights in the calculations. Suppose a subset R of the
third countries denominate their trade with the home (zero) country in
dollars, as an example. Then it seems intuitively plausible to argue
that those countries should be included In a "dollar area," and that
their weights should be combined with that of the U.S. in calculations.
This is not quite correct, though.
The true importance 3f the fact (if, indeed, it is a fact) that a
country h prices Its trade in dollars is the implicit assumption that
country h's prices move with U.S. prices, adjusted for the movements in
h's dollar exchange rate, 3h• This is the asthimption that h is a small country
relative to the United States. In this case the real exchange rate of h
vis—a—vis the U.S. is constant, and the term h +—inthe weighting
calculations is zero.
The implications of this for the use of the weighting schemes can be
seen by concentrating again on the example of the export price index for
country zero from Appendix 1:
(13) 'o —+k(r + —
p0)+ kZa1(J + —
Supposethe U.S. dollar is chosen as numeraire,so N is the U.S. Con—
aider first a case in which all othercountry's prices are independent15,
of the U.S. Then a impulse will raise p, by
xO kq +kEa1(_q)
=
Thesummation in the third termof(13) runs across all N countries. Thus
the q impulse is entered with a weight of unity in the term giving the real
exchange rate of the home country against the numeraire, but it is taken out
N—i
with a weight E a1 by the term giving movement in third—country real exchange
1
rates. Thus the weighting scheme itself gives a lone impulse a weight of
aN.
Now consider a case in which some subset of H countries
(1,..,h,..,H) have prices that move with the dollar, so that for eachof
these the real exchange rate vis—a—vis the dollar is constant. This is the
case in which the h countries are small relative to the U.S.,and one
would wish to integrate them into a dollar currency area. Now the effect
of a impulse on is given by
N—i H
kq + k Z a1() =k(aN+
x N H+1 1
Thus the aggregation of countries that are truly in a currency area
in the sense that their real exchange rates are constant vis—a—vis each16.
other is accomplished by the weighting index. If countries price their
trade in the same currency, but their prices move independently, they
will not and should not be aggregated. But iftheirprices move together,
theyautomatically will be.
The problem of a country which is selling a commodity priced in a
nuineraire on the world market is essentially the same. If copper trades
atone world price, then all the relevant q1 fora copper exporter will
movetogether, and be aggregated by the indexes into one world market.
At this level, the appropriate aggregation is again automatically achieved by
the index. The real problem for a commodity exporter will come with com-
modity disaggregation within the importing countries. This takes us to
the disaggregation question.
Levels of disaggregation.
While the indexes of equations (A.lO) —(A.13)will perform the aggreatinn
of the world market for a single—commodity exporter, they do not take in-
to account the probability that in each country i, the demand price for
the commodity moves somewhat independently of the average import—competing
price. This example raises one question of disaggregation. The formulas
in equations (A.1O) —(A.13),and the subsequent weighting schemes, treat
each country i as importing a single good with demand elasticity d•To
x
implementthe weighting schemes ideally, one would want to use for
q the internal demandpricesin country I for the particular exports
and imports of the home country zero, and apply to them the appropriate
disaggregated elasticity and share parameters. Thus for a country ex-
porting only copper, one would ideally use movements in copper prices in
the various I countries, combined with estimates of elasticities relevant
I.17.
for copper, and the exporter's trade shares. This would then give the
correct index for that country's p ,etc.,and the proper calculation
of weights.
Another major example of the disaggregation issue is the choice be-
tween current account and trade shares for and .Theeffective
weighting schemes of the IMF [see, for example Artus and Rhomberg (1973)1,
and the portfolio weights of Kouri and de Macedo (1978) and de Macedo
(1979) use current account shares.
In general, we would expect the services components of the current
account to have different elasticities than the trade component. For
example, if migrant workers determine the value of thiir remittances in
termsofforeign exchange, k is effectively unity. If they fix the value
in terms of their home currency, k is effectively zero. Thus ideally, the
shares should be current account shares, and the elasticities should be
averages of the trade and services components. Consistency would suggest
not using trade elasticities with current account shares.
The broad point here is that the formulas of section 2 are
highly aggregated, with elasticities implicitly given as weighted av-
erages of the relevant trade and services components. One can obtain a
first aggregate approximation for the weighting schemes by using trade
or current account shares and and the corresponding average elas-
ticities. But more precise calculation would require appropriate dis—
aggregation of both shares and elasticities.18.
4. Adjustment of the real exchange rate andchoiceof optimal weights.
The optimal weighting schemes of section 2 give alternative sets of
weights for real exchange rates which have the following property: if the
home country real exchange rate vis—a—vis the nutneraire follows the
path of the real basket rate, effects of third—country fluctuations in
real rates will not affect the chosen target. Thus if the nominal rate
r is manipulated to maintain
r+_P0=_zw1(J+q1_q)
with the appropriately—chosen weights w, the target is insulated from
movements in real rates (J + q —
Inthe case of the balance—of—trade weights, this movement in the
real rate will maintain trade or current account balance, depending on
whether the w1 include trade or current account weights. On the other
hand the terms—of—trade weights and the weights stabilizing the ratio
of prices of traded and non—traded goods willnot in general
meet a balance—of—payments target. If those weights are chosen, there
will still remain the need for adjustment of the real rate relative to
the basket to hold the balance of payments near its target. Onewayto




where B Is the balance on current account or overall payments, and R is
reserves. This is the real—rate equivalent of the basket crawl
formula (4) in B—K (1981).
r19.
The adjustment function F in equation(14) gives the speed at which
the home—countrY real rate is adjustedrelative to the basket real rate.
This is also the speed of adjustmentof the real effective rate defined
by Wj. The arguments of F (• ) arethe external—balance indicators
used to adjust the real effective rate.Obvious choices for these indi-
cators would include flows such asthe current—account balance, orstocks
such as reserves relative to a targetlevel. These are represented by
B and R, respectively, in (14).The optimal weighting of theseindicators
is analyzed in Branson—de Macedo(1980).
Since adjustment of the real effective rate,perhaps using a crawl
formula, can be used to maintain paymentsbalance, it would seem sensible
not to choose the trade—balance weightsfor the currency basket. One can
use, for example, thetraded vs non—traded goods weights to
eliminate variance in that ratio,and combine, this with a basket crawl
to maintain payments balance.
This combination would, of course, give a
non—zero trend in the ratio as the real rate vs the numeraire
moves relative to the basket, i.e.,
when F()310. This would be the trend in
needed to meet the external balance targetchosen for the F adjust—
ment function. However the choiceof weights (12) for T'O would reduce
the varianç, around that trend.
To summarize, adjustment of the
real effective rate can be used to
maintain external balance. This meansthat the weights for the currency
basket can be oriented toward a targetother than the trade balance,
namely toward one of the relative—pricetargets. Use of one of those20.
weighting schemes will then stabilize the chosen target around the trend
dictated by the necessary adjustment of the real effective rate.21.
5. Application to exchange—rate experience in Southern Europe.
Three countries in Southern Europe, Greece, Portugal, and Spain,
have experimented with versions of basket pegs since exchange rates
began to float in the early 1970s. In this s'ection we briefly ex-
amine their experience, to see whether their choice of weights roughly
conforms to the analysis above. We begin with a brief description of
their experience. Next we discuss choice of targets for these countries,
and finally we examine the evidence.
Experience since 1971.
Following the breakdown of the Bretton—Woods system of fixed parities,
Greece, Portugal, and Spain each sought to pursue a more flexible ex-
change rate policy. Given the fact that the major currenciesexhibited
substantial fluctuations vis—a—vis each other, pegging the exchange rate
to any single one of them meant substantial nd continuous realignments
vis—a—vis the others. Since all three countries have geographically
diversified trade (see Table 2 below), this implied that each would ex-
perience analogous tnovemnts in the home—currency price of tradedcotrimod—
ities if not of the terms of trade.
As early as the third quarter of 1971, Spain and Portugal abandoned
the dollar currency area and followed he Deutsche mark (DM) in its upward
trend against the dollar. This continued until the middle of 1975 when
both countries, hit by rising prices and appreciating effective real
exchange rates, started devaluing in nominal terms vis—a—vis bothhard
currencies. The escudo's devaluation against the dollar has continued22.
since; the devaluation against the DM halted around the end of 1979.
The Spanish authorities, probably sensitive to the inflationary conse-
quences of further nominal devaluations against as major a trading
partner as Germany, reversed that trend at the third quarter of 1977
and attempted to stabilize the rate around 36 !esetasfDN. This lasted
approximately until the end of 1979.
Greece followed the dollar in its downward movement vis—a—vis the
other hard currencies for a much longer period than either Spain or
Portugal. The rate was held at 30 drachina/dollar until the middle of
1975 when a basket peg was adopted and the drachnia started devaluing
vis—a—vis the basket. It is only towards the end of the decade, with
rapid inflation of import prices and the CPI, that the rapid depreciation
vis—a—vis the European currencies was slowed. This policy shift was also
prompted by increased trade prospects with the European Community (EC)
in light of the imminent entryintothe EC, and the expected movement
towards harmonization of monetary and exchange rate policies.
The experience of the three countries during tte 1970's can be thus
subdivided into three roughly comparable periods. In the first period,
mid—1971 to mid—1975, Spain and Portugal maintained rough parities
-vis—a—visthe Deutsche mark and appreciated substantially vis—a—vis the
dollar; in the case of Greece the opposite held true. In the second per-
iod which lasted to 1977 III in the case of Spain, anduntilthe end of
1979 in the other two countries, all three countries experienced substan-
tial effective nominal devaluations vis—a—vis all major trading partners.23.
Since that time, monetary authorities have attempted to maintain rough
parities with the European currencies.
Choice of targets for the currency basket.
Currency baskets aimed at stabilizing three different policy targets
were discussed in section 2 above. The targets are the trade balance,
the terms of trade, and the ratio of the price of traded goods to non—traded
goods T'N Which target would be most appropriate for Greece, Portugal,
and Spain?
In section 4, we argued that the effective real exchange rate can
be varied to meet a balance of trade target. This implies movement of
the home—currency real rate against the numeraire relative to the basket
real rate, as illustrated in equation (14). In Table 3 below, we see
that over the 1970s the effective real rate appreciated, on average, in
all three countries. In Table 4, we see that at least in the cases of
Portugal and Spain, there is evidence that the effective real rate was
responsive to an external balance target. Thus the choice of weights
for the currency basket itself comes down to terms—cit—trade vs
weights.
Exchange—rate policy can affect the terms of trade only in countries
with non—zero net market power; (k —.k)in equation (8) must be non—zero.
In Branson—Katseli (1980) we estimated indexes of market power on the
export side and the import side for 101 countries. [See B—K (1980,
pp. 62—67)]. Greece, Portugal, and Spain have relatively low values
of the market power index, suggesting that the small—country assumption
may be a good approximation in these cases. Thus the terms—of—trade
weights in equation (8 )areprobably not appropriate.21+,
Qn-the other hand, there isevidence that in these countriesexchange—
rate fluctuations do move Equations explaining quarterlymovements
in the consumr price index(CPI) for several countries wereestimated
in Katseli (1979). These
include movements in export pricesand import
prices in dollars, and inthe exchange rate as independentvariables. The
maximum estimated one—quarter
elasticities of the CPI with respect to a
traded—good price are: Greece,0.26 (export price); Portugal,0.37 (import
price); Spain, 0.09 (import price).
If these elasticities are close tothe
shares of traded goods in the CPI,the implicit elasticity of theratio
to changes in is cLose to unity. Given thesmallness of these
countries, this means that a givenchange in the exchange rate moves
more than it moves the termsof trade.
Thus the scanty evidence that isavailable suggests that the
weights of equation (12) abovewould be most appropriate for Greece,Portu-
gal, and Spain. If we assumethat the three countries are small,which
is consistent with the B—K (1980)calculations, these weights reduce to
total trade weights, as noted at theend of section 2.
Evidence from Greece, Portugal,and Spain
Table 2 shows the direction oftrade for the three countries inthe
1970s. In all three, the European
Community (EC) is the largest trading
partner ,with a sharearound 50 percent. For Greece, Germanyis the largest
among the EC countries,the UK dominates for Portugal,and Germany and
Prance come out about even in Spain.The U.S. share varies from 5 percent
of Greek exports to 15 percent of Spanish
imports. The trade sharesof Table 2




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Tables3 and 4 we show the results of regressionestimation of
the weights in equation (14) in section4 above. The dependent variable
is the quarterly percentage change in thecountry's real exchange rate
relative to the U.S. dollar, r + q5 —p0
.Theindependent variables
are the percentage changes in thereal exchange rates of the dollar a—
gainst the other major currencies, J.+ q —q(ius); thus the signs
of the coefficients should be negative. The implicitU.S. weight is
one minus the absolute value of the sumof the estimated weights for
i/US; w =11w .InTable 3 a constant term is included forthe
us 1
average movement of the realeffective rate over the period; a negative
coefficient indicates real appreciation. InTable 4 we add the level
and rate of change of net foreign assets, F and F, as indicators of
external balance.
In general, the equations for Portugaland Spain seem reasonable;
those for Greece are more difficult to interpret.This is probably due to
the fact that Greece's currency basket was defined across nominal rather
than real exchange rates. As has been shown in Katseli (1981), in the
case where the basket is defined across nominal rates, theestimated weights
are roughly the same as those of Table 3 but the explanatory powerof the
regression is markedly higher(R2 —.28).In Table 3, all the constants are
negative, indicating real appreciation relative to the basket.In Table 4,
the level of net foreign assets has a significant negativecoefficient for
Spain, and both F and F seem to play a role in Portugal.
The patterns of coefficients giving currency weights permit us to draw
several tentative but interesting conclusions
.Table 3:veentsof Real Bose—CurrettCY Price
of the DollarRelativeto Real Dollar
Price of Selected Currencies
(Quarterly Data 197011—19S0111
Percentage Chance)
$ CPIWC!£W_ I !11
C •


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. The estimated weights seem reasonable as a description of
actual experience. They do not, however, correspondparticularly closely
even to our T'N weights.
2. Over the whole period of the l970s the weight of the dollarin
the basket was markedly higher in the case of Greece than ineither
Portugal or Spain. This Is hard to explain in terms of the Greek trade
shares (Table 2) but can be understood in light of the inertiaof the
early period and preoccupation of the Greekauthorities with balance of
payments considerations.
.Theweight of the Deutsche, mark is highest inthe case of
Portugal (.63). Here again the explanation isprobably historical rela-
tionships and possibly a domestic inflationtarget. Maintaining a re-
latively stable rather than declininghome—currency value of emigrant
remittances might also be an importantaspect of that choice.
4. In all three cases the share of the Italian lirais quite high.
This probably reflects thepreoccupation with competitive export posi-
tions in third markets. p
5.For all countries there was a nominaldevaluation and real
appreciation of their currency relative to the basket. Thenominal de-
valuation was strongest in Portugal (8percenton an annual basis) com-
pared to Greece (approximately 4 percent) and Spain (lessthan one percent). [Katselj
(1981)]. On the other hand, the real appreciation vis—a—visthe basket
was strongest in the case of Spain (around 4 percent).30.
6. Inclusion of the current account balance and the level of foreign
assets as potential determinants of the adjustment vis—a—vis the basket
seem to improve both the Spanish and Portuguese results. This is esp-
ecially true for the stock of foreign assets, which proves to be an im—
-
portantdeterminant of the authorities' reaction to third—country exchange
rate movements. Inclusion of these two variables seems to make little
difference in the case of Greece.
These results suggest a general pattern: confronted with inflation-
ary pressures in the mid 1970's from both domestic and foreign origins,
•
the monetary authorities in all three countries attempted to safeguard
.their competitive position internationally through a process of nominal
effective devaluations. These policies produced only a relatively small
real effective exchange rate appreciation in the face of domestic infla-
tion rates which at least in Spain and Portugal exceeded 20 percent by
1977.
Thus by the end of the 1970s these countries found themselves caught
in the classic dilemma associated with exchange—rate policy, namely the
conflict between balance—of—trade and domestic inflation targets. The
econometric evidence,however sparse, seems to suggest that in small open
economies the effects of exchange rate movements on the price ratio of
traded to non—traded goods is higher than the effect on the terms of
trade. The experience of these countries in the l970s and the switch in
policies in the early 1980s seem to substantiate that claim.31.
Appendix 1: A log—linear trade model with real exchange rates.
In this section a simple partial—equilibrium model is developed that
.provides the framework for the choice of weights for currency baskets or
effective exchange rates. The model is essentially the same as that
developed in Branson—Katseli (B—K, 1981), section IV. There independence
of movements in exchange—rates and price levels was implicitly assumed.
Here the model is developed in terms of real exchange rates. It is a log—
linear supply—and—demand model for exports and imports which Includes the
exchange rate as the translator between home and foreign prices. We begin
with the simple two—country version, and then disaggregate to many countries
and a numeraire.
Movements in aggregate trade prices and quantities.
Let us begin by concentrating on the export side. Export supply prices
are assumed to be stated in home currency units p, while foreign import
demand prices are given in foreign exchange units q. The supply function
is written as
(A.l)lnp lnp +11nX
Herep Is a shift parameter representing the domestic cost of production
of exportables and s is the price elasticity of export supply. We assume
that p is also the home—currency cost of production of import substitutes
and non—tradëables. Equation (A.1) gives export supply X as a function
of the relative home—currency supply price p/p. The demand function
giving the foreign currency price of exports is32.
(A.2) lnq ].nq +d'lnX.
Rere q is a shift parameter representingthe domestic cost of production
of import—competing goods in the foreign country,and export demand depends
on the relative price Again,we assume that q is also the costof
production of exports in the foreign country.For the analysis in a case
where domestic costs of production in thevarious sectors move differently,




Substitution of (A,3) -into (A.2) for q andtotal differentiation yields
the expressions for percentage changesin export prices and quantities:
(A.4) —k(e + q) + (1 —k);,
(A.5)
where k d/(d — 0<k<1.As noted in B—K (1980, 1981), k is
an index of market power on the exportside. In the small—country case
d +-oandk+1. x
Theanalogous model on the import side yieldsthe equations for per—
centage changes in import prices and quantities:
(A.6) 'm





0 <k'<1.Again, k' is an index of market
power on the import side;for a small country where s +, k'+1.33.
DisaggregatiOn to many countries.
To disaggregate the model, we consider a world of N + 1 countries,
O,...,N. Country zero is the home country, whose exchange—ratepolicy we
are analyzing. Country N is the numeraire, arbitrarilychosen. Countries
j (— L,...,j,...,N—1)are the other (non—home, non-numeraire) countries
in the system. The index i runsacrossall countries other than the home
country, including the numeraire, thus i —j,N.
The home—country price index p in equation (1) is now p0. The import—
competing price in country i's demand function is q and the export—
supply price of country i is Thebilateral exchange rate of the home
country 0 against country i is in units of currency zero per unit of
currency i. This can be decomposed into thehome country price of the
numeraire r, and the numeraire price of the currency i, J:
(A.8) Ti Jr.
For gxposition, we focus on disaggregation of movements in the export
price p0; disaggregation of X0, p0, and M0 follow easily by analogy.
With export weights given by ci, e and q in the p equation






The disaggregated expression for p is now(A. 9) xo kZa1 (J +r)+ kEci1q1+ (1—
k)p0.
34.




First, let us add
competing price in
(A.lO)
same as equation (24) in B—K (1981), with slight
The analysis there proceeded in terms of nominal
we wish to continue in terms of movements in real
and subtract the change in the numeraire's import—
the second term of (A.9):
x0 —kEa(J+r)+ kEct1(q
—+ +(1 —k);0.
Now, remembering that Zc&1, we can re—group the terms on the right—
hand side into movements in real exchange rates:
PxO P0 + k(r +'N
— +kEcx(J +q —
Thefirst term on the RUSof(A.10) is the change in the domestic (zero—
country) export supply price due to changes in domestic cost conditions.
The second term is the change in the home—country real exchange rate against
the numeraire, using export prices. The third term sums the change in the
numeraire's real exchange rate against all countries other than the home
country, including the numeraire (country N), again using demand prices
for exports of the zero country.
Several properties of (A.lO) for are worth noting:35.
1. If the home country is small, k —1and p0 drops Out of
(A.lO); p depends only on world prices and exchange rates.
2. An increase in the demand priceq
in any one of the j (non—
numeraire, non—home) countries clearly raise p by —
proportional to j's share in home—country exports. The increase
in
qj
also raises the numeraire's real exchange rate vis—a—vis j.
3. An increase in the demand price in the nuineraire country alone
raises by = symmetrically to all the other countries.
This results from the summation of the third term in (A.l0) across
all il,...,N. Thus the formulation in (A.l0) is completely
symmetric across all non—home countries, with the numeraire chosen
arbitrarily.
The disaggregation of the expressions for X, p and H, and their state-
ment in terms of real exchange rates, follow analogously to the develop-
ment from equation (A.4) for to (A.l0) for xO The disaggregated
version of (A.5) for the change in exports is
(A.ll) -ks((r+- p0)+ Ea1(J + -
Onthe import side, e and ciIn equations (A.6) and (A.7) disaggregate into
a N *•




where 81.areimport weights, and E8 —1.The disaggregated versions of




(A.13) —k'd[(r+ — +E81.(J1 + —
In(A.12) and (A.13), the term (; + —
p0)
is the change in the home
country's real exchange rate against the numeraire, and the term
(J + q — isthe real exchange rate of the numeraire against country I
(including the numeraire), using the prices relevant for country zero's
imports.
Equations (A.l0) —(A.13)give the expressions for changes in export
and import prices and quantities in terms of movements in home prices and
real exchange rates.References
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